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Estate Planning
PROPOSED TESTAMENTARY CHARITABLE TRUST OF CLOSE
CORPORATE STOCK

Introduction
A problem area of growing importance in the field of estate
planning concerns the testate disposition of stock holdings in close
corporations. The solution to any particular problem in this area
is necessarily dependent upon the factual situation presented and
the wishes of the testator. Perhaps the most important of the
many factors to be considered in drawing up an estate plan for
a stockholder of a close corporation are: his duty to the other
stockholders to see that his shares do not fall into unfriendly
hands; his relationship to the surviving stockholders and their
ability to carry on the business after his death; and the value and
,composition of his estate and its ability to absorb expenses and
taxes without necessitating a sale of the stock.'
A frequently occurring situation, and the one with which this
article will be concerned, may be generally described: The testator owns a substantial percentage of the shares of a close corporation, the other shareholders of which are members of his immediate family and perhaps a non-family managing associate. He
is an active member of the corporation and has considerable influence in the management of its affairs. He wishes to dispose of
his shares after his death in such a way that their control will
remain within the family. However, he also wishes to make a gift
to charity, fulfilling any charitable obligation he may have, and
to lower his estate taxes by means of the charitable deduction.2
If the testator has a large estate other than his holdings in the
corporation, he may will the shares to his family, make a charitable gift, paying the taxes and expenses of the estate out of the
other assets. However, even under these circumstancs, such a plan
may prove unsatisfactory because should the corporation fail to
survive the loss of his managerial services, his family may be
left holding worthless stock which probably had poor marketable

I

See Estate Planning, Interests in Close Corporations,1 CCH FED. EST.
(1955) for a detailed discussion of estate

& G=FT TAX REP. fTII7401-7427

planning problems in this field and proposed solutions.
2 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2055.
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qualities originally. On the other hand, should he make an outright charitable gift of such stock and the corporation continues to
prosper, the benefit of the stock and its control would no longer
be in the family and conceivably could fall into hostile hands.
The purpose of this article is to set forth an estate plan which
would overcome the difficulties met in these situations.
The plan may be described as a charitable trust of close corporate stock subject to an option given to the shareholders of the
corporation to purchase such stock.3 The stock would be the res
of a testamentary trust under the terms of which a named charitable institution would be the beneficiary and the surviving
shareholders, or any of them, or the corporation itself, would
be the trustees. This trust would be made subject to an option
given the surviving shareholders, or any of them, or the corporation 4 to purchase the stock within a short period of time, perhaps
ten or fifteen years, at a price established by the terms of the
trust. At the expiration of the option period, or at the time of
exercise of the option, the trust would terminate and the res
(the purchase price if option is exercised or the stock) would go
absolutely to the charity. The benefit of the option to the family
is in the right to choose to purchase if the corporation prospers.

The Trust
I.

Validity of the Trust and its Provisions

In determining the advisability of utilizing the plan as set out
above, the planner should first examine the laws of his state to
determine whether or not the proposed trust or any of its provisions may be invalid.
An apparent objection to the trust is that the trustees, the
surviving stockholders or the corporation which they control, are
given the option to purchase the trust res. It is a fundamental
principle of trust law that the trustee is a fiduciary and as such
is under a duty to the beneficiaries of the trust to administer it
3 For cases involving similar plans, but where the beneficiaries were
not charitable, see Kitts v. Hanna, 29 F.2d 1010 (E.D. Pa.), affd', 29 F.2d

1013 (3d Cir. 1928); Rosencrans v. Fry, 12 N.J. 88, 95 A.2d 905 (1953);

Robertson v. Hert's Adm'rs, 312 Ky. 405, 227 S.W.2d 899 (1950).
4 Before selecting the corporation as optionee, the planner should examine his state statutes to determine whether the corporation is prohibited from purchasing its own stock. For a state by state listing of
such statutes, see 1 CCIH FED. EsT. & GIT RP. ff 7412 (1955).
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solely in their interest.5 He will not be permitted to enter into any
engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest
conflicting with those of the beneficiary. 6 This duty precludes the
trustee from selling, directly or indirectly, property of the trust to
himself or to a corpbration in which he has an interest.7 He is not
permitted to assume the opposing positions of seller and buyer,"
and any such sale is voidable by the beneficiary.9 However, in
the absence of a statute or expressions of public policy to the
contrary, it has been held that this prohibition is not applicable
where by the terms of the trust the trustee is given the right to
purchase the trust property. 10 This right need not be express
but may be implied." But the trustee must pay a fair price and
not be guilty of bad faith.' 2 This exception to the general rule
prohibiting self-dealing has been recognized by the courts of
Arizona, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin,13 and by statute in Washington.' 4 It is reasoned that since
5 Chandler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941); Societa
Operaia Di Mutuo Soccorso Villalba v. Di Maria, 40 N. J. Super. 344, 122
A.2d 897 (Ch. 1956); Manchester v. Cleveland Trust Co., 95 Ohio App. 201,
114 N.E.2d 242 (1953); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 170 (1) (1935); 2 S,7OTT, TiRUSTS
§170 (2d ed. 1956).
6 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Freud, 115 Md. 29, 80 Atl. 603 (1911).
* Daniel v. Henderson, 183 S.W2d 242, aff'd sub nom., Southern Trust
& Mortgage Co. v. Daniel, 143 Tex 321, 184 S.W.2d 465 (1944); Hamrick v.
Bryan, 21 F. Supp. 392 (N. D. Okla. 1937), modified, 106 F.2d 245 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 615 (1939) (dictum) ; 2 ScoTT, TRusTs §§ 170.1, 170.10 (2d
ed. 1956).
8 Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 502, 555 (1846).
9 Michoud v. Girod, supra note 8; 2 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 170.1 (2d ed. 1956).
It makes no difference whether or not the trustee acted in good faith and
paid a fair price.
10 Robertson v. Hert's Adm'rs, 312 Ky. 405, 227 S.W.2d 899 (1950); In re
Balfe's Will, 245 App. Div. 22,280 N.Y. Supp. 128 (Sup. Ct. 1935); RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS § 170 (1), comment s (1935); 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 170.9 (2d ed. 1956).
"
Rosencrans v. Fry, 12 N.J. 88, 95 A2d 905 (1953); In re Flagg's Estate,
365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411 (1950); In re Schuster's Estate, 35 Ariz. 457, 281 Pac.
38 (1929). But see, In re Durston's Will, 297 N.Y. 64, 74 N.E.2d 310, 313
(1947), where it was held that the words "with all the authority, and
powers in connection with the same, I would possess, if living" were not
sufficient to authorize self-dealing.
12 See note 10 supra.
3 Arizona: In re Schuster's Estate, 35 Ariz. 457,281 Pac. 38 (1929). Illinois:
Morris v. The Broadview, Inc., 328 ill. App. 267, 65 N.E.2d 605 (1946). Kinney
v. Lindgren, 373 Ill. 415, 26 N.E.2d 471, 474 (1940) (dictum). Kentucky:
Robertson v. Hert's Adm'rs, 312 Ky. 405, 227 S.W.2d 899 (1950). Maryland:
Turk v. Grossman, 176 Md. 644, 6 A.2d 639 (1939); Harlan v. Lee, 174 Md.
Continued on page 711
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the settfor has the power to dispose of his property in any manner
and under any conditions he may choose, provided he violates
no principle of public policy, he may, incident to the administration of his property, place the trustee in a position of conflicting
interest. 15 The beneficiary should not be heard to complain for
he receives all that was intended to be given him.
Also, if the conditions of the sale and the purchase price are
set by the trust instrument, it cannot be said that the trustee
occupies the conflicting roles of seller and buyer, for in fact, the
settlor is the seller. Therefore, where the trust instrument had
set the price as the value of the property for federal estate tax
purposes' or geared it to the inventory value of the business, 17
the sale has been upheld. Even where the trustee himself was
authorized to determine the price, the sale has been held valid
8
provided the price was fair.'
The rule prohibiting self-dealing is stated to be based upon
strong public policy. From this it may be argued that any provision in the trust permitting such is void as contrary to this
policy. However, even those courts which describe the rule as uncompromisingly rigid,19 absolute,20 stubborn and inflexible, 21

579, 199 Atl. 862 (1938). Massachusetts: Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
MASS. Aim. LAWS c. 203,
§ 16 (1955). Michigan: Waddell v. Waddell, 335 Mich. 498, 56 N.W.2d 257
(1953). But see, MLcu. CoAni. LAws § 709.27 (1948). New Jersey: Rosencrans
v. Fry, 12 N.J. 88, 95 A.2d 905 (1953). New York: In re Durston's Will, 297
N.Y. 64,74 N.E.2d 310 (1947); Heyman v. Heyman, 33 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct.
1942). Oklahoma: Finley v. Exchange Trust Co., 183 Okla. 167, 80 P.2d 296
(1938). But see, OiLA. STAT. ANm. tit. 60, §§ 175.11, 175.21, 175.22 (1949)
which prohibits a corporate trustee from purchasing trust property even
when authorized to do so by the terms of the trust. Pennsylvania: In re
Flagg's Estate, 365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411 (1950); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.966
(Purdon 1950). Wisconsin: Welch v. Welch, 235 Wis. 282, 290 N.W. 758,
-mandatemodifted, 235 Wis. 282, 293 N.W. 150 (1940).
14 WAsH. REv. CoDE § 30.24.090 (1955). Statutes of Florida and Connecticut
indicate that the exception may be recognized there. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
"733.22 (1944); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7021, 7028 (1949).
15 In re Flagg's Estate, 365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411 (1950).
16 Robertson v. Hert's Adm'rs, 312 Ky. 405, 227 S.W.2d 899 (1950).
17 Waddell v. Waddell, 335 Mich. 498, 56 N.W.2d 257 (1953).
IS Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Lewis, 317 Mass. 137, 57 N.E2d
638 (1944).
19 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
20 Dufford v. Nowakoski, 125 N. J. Eq. 262, 4 A.2d 314, 317 (Ct. Err. &
-App. 1939).
21 Lawndale Nat'l Bank v. Kaspar American State Bank, 288 Ill. App.
.555, 6 N.E.2d 670, 672 (1937).

Lewis, 317 Mass. 137, 57 N.2d 638 (1944); See

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Vol. XXXII

recognize the above exception.2 2 Also, it may be contended that
the policy that a fiduciary shall not be permitted to purchase is,
expressed in the statutory provision in force in many states that
"an executor or administrator shall not.., purchase any property
of the estate he represents. . .

."2

But, the terms "administrator"

and "executor" are technical and should not be held to include
trustees. The Arizona Supreme Court did not apply their statute&
to a trustee's purchase, 24 and the courts of Michigan and Pennsylvania have indicated that such prohibition, though stated in
mandatory terms, does not apply to an executor's purchase which
was authorized by the terms of the will. 25 However, it should be
noted that several state statutes use the word "fiduciary" and 2it6
may be that under these statutes the option would be held void.
At any rate, the argument would be stronger.
It is clear that in some states the option provision of the trust
2 7
is expressly outlawed by statute. The UNIom TRUSTS

ACT,

which has been adopted verbatim or with minor changes and.
omissions in Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina,,
Oklahoma, South Dakota and Texas, 28 provides in section 5:
No trustee shall directly or indirectly buy or sell any property for

the trust from or to itself or an affiliate; or from or to a director,
See cases listed under note 13 supra.
§ 61-14-26 (1949); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
14-604 (West 1956); IDAHO CODE ANN. 742 § 15-742 (1948); MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. § 91-3039 (1947); N. D. REv. CODE § 30-1927 (1943); TFEX. PROB. CODE§ 352 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-10-6 (1953). This provision is said to be
22

23

ALASKA CoIup. LAWS ANN.

but a declaration of the fundamental principle of trusteeship which prohibits trustees from dealing with the subject matter of their trusts in any
way which may inure to their personal benefit. Bruun v. Hanson, 103 F.2&
685 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 571 (1939); Haight v. Pearson, U Utah
51, 39 Pac. 479 (1895).
24 In re Schuster's Estate, 35 Ariz. 457, 281 Pac. 38 (1929).
25 Curtis v. Brewer, 140 Mich. 139, 103 N.W. 579 (1905); In re Wallace's
Estate, 299 Pa. 333, 149 Atl. 473, 475 (1930) (dictum).
26 KAN. GEN. STAT. AN. § 59-1703 (1949); Micx. CoxI'. LAWS § 709.2T
(1948); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 619 (1942). The Michigan statute states that such
sales shall be void but the courts permit the trustee to purchase when authorized to do so by the terms of the trust. Waddell v. Waddell, 335 Mich.
498, 56 N.W.2d 257 (1953).
27 One of the purposes of this act is to clarify and tighten the rules
regarding loyalty by a trustee to the interests of his beneficiary. Commis-sioners' Prefatory Note, 9A UNioomu LAws ANx. 333 (1951).
28 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1791-9:2212 (West 1950); NEV. Comp. LAWS
§§ 7718.30-7718.52 (Supp. 1941); N. M. STAT. Azm. §§ 33-3-1 - 33-3-22 (1953);
N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-24 - 36-46 (1950); OKLA. STAT. ANm. tit. 60, §§ 175.1 175.53 (1949); S. D. CODE §§ 59.0501- 59.0924 (Supp. 1952); TEx. Rsv. Civ..
STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-1 - 7425b-47 (1951).
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officer, or employee of such trustee or of an affiliate; or from or to a
relative, employer, partner, or other business associate.

This language clearly includes corporate as well as individual
trustees. By virtue of sections 17 and 18, the settlor and the
beneficiaries are expressly denied the power to relieve the
trustee of this restriction.29 In Texas and Oklahoma this power
is denied only where the trustee is a corporation.3 0 Under an
Ohio statute3 ' a corporate trustee may never purchase, and an
individual trustee only when permission is granted by the probate court. In California and North Dakota it appears that a
purchase under the option would be valid only if all the bene-ficiaries having capacity to contract are fully informed of the
facts and consent and the proper court grants permission in behalf of those lacking such capacity. 32 Presumably, a testator could
safely use the proposed plan in these two states if he notifies his
chosen charitable beneficiary of his intentions, fully informs it of
the trust provisions and all other pertinent facts and then contracts with it that should he name it beneficiary it will consent
to the trustee's purchase of the stock.
In those states where the option would be held invalid because
of the conflict of interests, substantially the same result as that
of the trust plan may be obtained by bequeathing the stock
to the charitable institution subject to an option given the surviving shareholders, or any of them, or to the corporation to
purchase within a period and at a price set by the will. The major
difference under this plan is that the charity will have the right
to vote the stock until the option is exercised. Unless this could

upset the family's control of the corporation, it should not prove
objectionable. The only possible legal objection to such a gift
is that the option constitutes a restraint upon alienation. However, if it is a restraint at all,3 3 it would merely be an indirect
29 Section 17. ". . . but no act of the settlor shall relieve a trustee from
the duties, restrictions, and liabilities imposed upon him by Sections 3, 4

and 5 of this Act."
Section 18. "Any beneficiary ...

may ...

relieve the trustee... from any

or all of the duties, restrictions, and liabilities . .. imposed on the trustee
. .except as to [those] imposed by Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this Act."
30 OKLA. STAT. AN. tit. 60, §§ 17521, 175.22 (1949); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 7425b-22, 7425b-23 (1951). ... no act ... shall relieve a corporate
trustee... !'(Emphasis added.)
31 OHmo Rv.CODE Ass. § 2109.44 (Page 1954).
32 CAL. Civ. CODE ANNx. § 2230 (West 1954); N. D. Rv.CODE § 59-0111
(1943).
33 See In re Remensnyder's Estate, 267 Pa. 348, 110 Atl. 244 (1920), where
Continued on page 714
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and partial one.34 Such restraints are upheld where reasonable. 35
In view of the nature of the corporation and the duration of the
option provision, the restraint in this situation clearly appears to
be reasonable. The UNiFoRm STOCK TRANSFER ACT, which has
been adopted by all the states, provides that no restriction upon
the transfer of the shares shall be enforceable unless the restriction is stated upon the certificate.3 6 Therefore, if this plan is
adopted, it would be advisable to have the provisions of the option
printed upon the stock certificates.
It may appear that another way to circumvent the prohibition
against the trustee purchasing the trust property is to make the
corporation the trustee and the shareholders the optionees, or
vice versa. But, the trustee's duty of loyalty also precludes him
from selling to a corporation in which he has a substantial interest,3 7 and in the case of a corporate trustee, from selling to
one who exercises control over its operations. 38 Even though this
arrangement may not fall under the specific prohibition of the
state statute, the courts would probably disregard the corporate
entity and hold that the trustee and optionee were the same perSons.

39

II. Selecting The Trustee
Because the trustee under the proposed plan will have the
power to exercise the voting rights of the stock placed in trust,
the testator should select as trustee one whose interest or ideas
of management will least conflict with those of the surviving
in a bequest of corporate stock in trust, a proviso was upheld which stated
that before the stock was sold, it should first be offered to a named person at
book value. The lower court stated: "There is a marked distinction between
a restraint against alienation and a gift with a condition annexed, one implies a violation of, and the other a compliance with, the policy of the
law ..... 110 Atl. at 244.
34 In our case the stock could always be sold by the charity, but subject
to the option.
35 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 2083 (1940).
36 UNIFORM STOcx TaAFSR ACT § 15. For a listing of the state statutes,
see 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 6 (Supp. 1956).
37 See note 7 supra.
38 Purchase v. Atlantic Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 344, 87 Atl.
444 (Ch. 1912), aff'd mer., 81 N. J. Eq. 353, 91 AtI. 1070 (Ct. Err. & App.
1914); H. B. Cartwright & Bros. v. United States Bank & Trust Co., 23 N. M.
82, 167 Pac. 436 (1917). 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 170.11 (2d ed. 1956).
39 Mosher v. Lee, 32 Ariz. 560, 261 Pac. 35 (1927); Horowitz, Disregarding
the Entity of Private Corporations, 15 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1940).
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stockholders. The greater the voting powers of the trust shares,
the more important this factor becomes. Therefore, if the laws of
the state and the policy against self-dealing permit, in order to
avoid any such conflict it is advisable that the surviving stockholders or the corporation which they control be named trustee.
The testator should be careful to select a person whom he
knows has capacity to take title to the property by will, to retain
such title, and to administer the trust. This is important because
although the trust will not fail if the named trustee lacks one of
the above capacities, 40 the testator has no assurance that the
court will select a replacement who would not create friction
within the family corporation. In most cases a natural person
who is of age and capable of manging his own property can safely
be named as trustee. In most states a private corporation cannot
take property by will unless expressly authorized to do so by its
charter or statute.41 A corporation cannot engage in administering
a trust unless it is similarly authorized or if the purposes of such
trust are germane to the purpose for which it was created.42 However, in the majority of cases, it would seem that the purposes
of a charitable trust would not be germane to those of a private
close corporation.
The rule stated above that a trust will not fail for the want of
a trustee is not applicable where the testator manifests an intention that the existence of the trust be dependent upon its administration by the particular person named by him as trustee. Here
the entire trust will fall if the named individual dies or is incapable of administering the trust.43 Under the facts of the proposed plan, a court could conceivably find either way. Therefore,
the testator should provide in his will whether or not he wishes
the trust to fall should the named trustee fail to qualify. His de40 Equity will not permit a trust to fail for want of a trustee, as the court
will appoint one if necessary. In re Barter's Estate, 30 Cal2d 549, 184 P2d 305
(1947); Hoeffer v. Clogan, 171 Ill. 462, 49 NE. 527 (1898).
41 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 27 (West 1956); N. D. Rsv. CODE §
56-0205 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 45 (1951); S. D. CODE § 56.0205
(1939). In California, a corporation ineligible under the statute to take a
testamentary bequest for its own benefit may nevertheless receive, as
trustee, a bequest for a charitable purpose. See In re Tarrans Estate, 38

Cal.2d 42 237 P.2d 505 (1951).
42 Hossack v. Ottawa Development Ass'n, 244 IM. 274, 91 N.E. 439 (1910);
Thomas v. General Bd. of Church of Nazarene, 76 R.I. 197, 68 A.2d 66 (1949);
Latshaw v. Western Townsite Co., 91 Wash. 575, 158 Pac. 248 (1916).
43 South End Bank & Trust Co. v. Hurwitz, 128 Conn. 204, 21 A.2d 407
(1941); Hentschell v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 87 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1937)

(dictum).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Vol. XXXII

cision will necessarily depend upon the relative importance he
places upon who will possess the voting power of the stock
as against the other advantages of the plan.
III. Selecting the CharitableBeneficiary
The testator in drawing up his estate plan may either designate
a specific charitable institution as beneficiary or direct the trustees to make the selection. If he plans to designate a specific
institution, he should first check to see if it would be recognized
under federal tax law" as being charitable. If it would not, no
charitable deduction from his gross estate would obtain for
estate tax purposes. Secondly, since the gift will not be made
until he dies, he should contact the intended beneficiary to determine whether or not it would accept the gift, for if after his
death it should refuse to accept, the trust would fail for lack of a
beneficiary and the corpus (the stock) would revert back to his
estate. His entire plan would fail. In order to avoid such a result,
the testator, if at all possible, should also contract with the intended beneficiary to the effect that should he name it beneficiary, it would accept the gift.
Although there seems to be no case concerning such a contract, it should be specifically enforceable on general equity
principles. In effect it is an option contract; if the testator chooses
to exercise the option and make a gift, the charitable institution
is bound to accept. Option contracts, though lacking in mutuality,
have been held to be specifically enforceable where the remedy
at law is inadequate.45 Certainly in this case there is no adequate
legal remedy. Money damages would be practically impossible to
determine. On one hand the testator's estate taxes would be increased but on the other, his estate would have the stock. Another
factor to be considered is that by the gift the testator also wished
to fulfill his charitable obligations. Since he is now dead, he cannot make another gift. It may be argued that this is purely a
matter of sentiment, but such are recognized in equity. An heirloom may be of a common class and a duplicate easily obtainable
but, due to the sentimental value attached, equity will grant
relief in proper cases.46 The contract should be for a separate
§

44

INT. REV. CODE of 1954

45

FRY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

2055.
OF CONTRACTS

POMROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS

EQurrY

§

§ 291 (2d Am. ed. 1871);
§ 169 (3d ed. 1926); CLARK,

178 (1954); 2 BEVERiDrE, LAW OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION

§ 19.17

(1956).
46

Marthinson v. King, 150 Fed. 48, 52 (5th Cir. 1906) (dictum); Carolee v.

Handelis, 103 Ga. 299, 29 S.E. 935, 937 (1898) (dictum); Adams v. Messenger,
147 Mass. 185, 17 N.E. 491, 495 (1888) (dictum).
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consideration to make it binding, and in writing, to avoid any
difficulty with the statute of frauds. The terms and conditions of
the intended gift should be incorporated in the contract to make
it certain and complete, for47the court may have to decide just
what the defendant must do.
Even should the testator enter the contract as outlined, many
events may occur between the time of its making and the death of
the testator which would make it impossible or highly inequitable
to enforce it. Since the testator cannot foresee such events, he
should in addition to naming the beneficiary, provide that should
the gift fail, the trustees are to select a beneficiary recognized as
charitable under the estate tax law. This way the trust would not
fail for want of a beneficiary.
Estate Tax Consequences
Because death may involve the payment of substantial federal
estate taxes, the tax consequences of any estate plan must be
considered. The estate tax problem which the proposed estate
plan presents is the realization of the maximum deduction for
the gift to charity.48
I. Requirements for Deductibility of Charitable Gifts
In seeking a charitable deduction under the federal estate tax
for any gift by testamentary disposition, several general principles
must be considered. The charitable deduction is to be allowed
only for a gift to a qualified charity. 49 The gift must be clearly
47 Colson v. Thompson, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 336 (1817); Ginsburg v. White,
139 N. J. Eq. 271, 50 A.2d 644 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947); FaY, SPECxFIC PERFoRMANcE OF CoNTRAcTs § 229 (2d Am. ed. 1871).
48 IT. Pa. CoDE OF 1954, § 2055 provides:
"(a) For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of
the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value
of the gross estate the amount of all bequests, legacies, devises or
transfers...

"(2) to or for the use of any corporation organized exclusively for
... charitable

...

purposes...

"(3) to a trustee or trustees . ., but only if such contributions or
gifts are to be used by such trustee or trustees, ...exclusively for... charitable. .. purposes ......

The purposes which will qualify a corporation, association, or trust
under § 2055 as charitable is a problem not within the scope of this note. See
LOWNDES &KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIF TAXEs 351-52 (1956).
49
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ascertainable at the time of the testator's death with the possibility of the gift being diverted to someone other than a charity
being "negligible" or "highly improbable." 50 The value of a gift
of property to charity cannot depend upon any subsequently occurring events which are speculative in nature.5 1
Under the proposed plan the value of the gift to charity is
definite at the testator's death as the value can never be more
than the option price. This is the necessary result for if the value
of the stock were to go higher than the option price it is assumed
the optionee will purchase; the proceeds will then be given to
charity and the trust terminated.
If the gift to the charitable trust is void under the law of the
jurisdiction in which the estate is to be probated, a charitable
deduction will not be allowed even though the heirs convey the
intended bequest to the charity named in the will.52 However,
if the bequest is held to be voidable and the persons having the
right to avoid the gift fail to do so, and the gift goes to charity,
a deduction for a charitable gift will be allowed the estate.53
If the testator has a particular charity or charities in mind
at the time the will is executed, they should be explicitly mentioned in the will in order to prevent lawsuits.
Should the
testator provide for a selection of the beneficiary by the trustee,
the trust instrument must bind the trustee to choose a qualified
charity and to use the proceeds of the trust exclusively for
charitable purposes.5 5 If the trustee is granted the discretionary
50 Commissioner v. Sternberger's Estate, 348 U.S. 187 (1955); Henslee v.
Union Planters Natl Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595 (1949). See Cohen,
Means and Methods of Making CharitableContributions Under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, 3 ST. Louis U.L.J. 117, 130 (1954).
51 Merchants Natl Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943); Humes v.
United States, 276 U.S. 487 (1928); Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
151 F.2d 592 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 788 (1946); St. Louis Union
Trust Co. v. Burnet, 59 F.2d 922 (8th Cir. 1932).
52 William A. Carey, 9 T.C. 1047 (1947), aff'd per curiam sub nom.,
Marine Natl Bank of Erie v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1948);
Valentine Janson, 3 B.T.A. 296 (1926).
53 Nicholas Murray Butler, 18 T.C. 914 (1952); Melusina H. Varick, 10
T.C. 318 (1948).
54 Turk, Estate Planning Suggestions- Deductions, 94 TRUSTS Am EsTATES 225 (1955).
55 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 2055 (a) (3). There is a conflict as to whether
the charitable deduction will be allowed only when the terms of the will
clearly indicate that the proceeds of the res shall go to a charitable beneficiary, or whether upon the finding of a constructive trust, the court will
allow the charitable deduction. Compare Delaney v. Gardner, 204 F.2d 855
(1st Cir. 1953), with Marine Midland Trust Co. v. McGowan, 223 F.2d 408
(2d Cir. 1955).
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power to give the bequest either to a charitable or a non-charitable beneficiary, a deduction will be refused because it is not
certain the charity will receive the bequest when the testator
the act of the
dies.56 If the gift is made in this way it is considered
57
trustee or administrator and not of the testator.
The amount of any charitable deduction for any gift of
property is limited to the valuation of the same property when
included in the testator's gross estate. 55 The proposed estate plan
presumes that it is the testator's intent that the person buying the
stock from the charitable trust will pay a fair value for it and
that the testator has no intention of making a disguised bequest
to the party purchasing the stock or of obtaining an unduly low
valuation to minimize his estate tax.5 9 The solution to the problem
depends on a determination of a method whereby the value
of the stock when included in the gross estate is the same as
that which the charity is assured of receiving. It is therefore
submitted that the proposed stock purchase agreement will be
the best method, as restrictive stock option agreements have been
held to be determinative of the value of the stock to be included
in the gross estate.60
II. Restrictive Stock Option as Limiting the
Value of the Stock
The use of this type of agreement to establish the value of
the stock normally results in a lower valuation of the stock than
if the value were left to be determined by the valuation experts
56 In Norris v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 796 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 756 (1943), under the state law, the will created a "precatory" trust
-thus the trustee was under no obligation to make the gift to charity. See
Delbridge v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 845 (ED. Mich. 1950).
57 Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F.2d 197 (8th Cir.
1934).
58 "This carries out the very reasonable purpose not to permit deductions
for items which are not included in the gross estate." 2 BEVEPmGE, LAw OF
FEDE AL ESTATE TAxATioN § 15.01 (1956).
59 One author points out that this might be the crux of the decision
should the question come before any of the circuit courts except that of
the Second Circuit. Pavenstedt, The Second Circuit Reaffirms the Efficacy
of Restrictive Stock Agreements to Control Estate Tax Valuation, 51 MIcH.
L. REv.1, 28 (1952).
60 May v. McGowan, 194 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1952). That case reaffirms in
general the earlier authorities of Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.
1932) and Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1936). Only the stock covered
by the agreement will be free from outside valuation. Friedman, Buy and
Sell Agreements: A Review and a New Look, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
1053, 1071 (1957).
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of the Internal Revenue Service.
agreement establishes the
option
stock
the
not
Whether or
value of the testator's stock for estate tax purposes depends on
the facts of each case62and whether or not the agreement is merely
a disguised bequest.
The restrictive stock agreement must meet certain requirements in order to effectively limit valuation. 63 The option to
purchase stock must be more than an offer; at least, it must be
a binding agreement as determined by the laws of the particular
state.61 In order to make it binding, the first requisite is that there
be sufficient consideration for the agreement. 65 It is the binding

nature of the option which permits use of the restrictive stock
agreement for valuation purposes. The courts consider these
agreements valid in establishing the stock's value because they

provide for the maximum value of the stock at the testator's
death.66 Without consideration, the estate would not be bound
61 In a recent survey of cases involving the valuation of stock of a close
corporation for federal estate taxation, it was found that out of 148 cases the
executor's valuation of the stock was sustained in only 20. Although this
result is tempered by the fact that some of the differences were not excessive, there were enough large tax deficiencies to make this an important
problem when formulating a plan for an estate which will include close
corporation stock. The possibility that the executor's valuation of the stock
will be upheld has become much less probable in recent years as the courts
have sustained the executor's valuation in only four cases since 1945.
Pavenstedt, supra note 59, at 4-6.
62 Rev. Rul. 54-77, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 187, at 193-94.
".... [W]hile a bona fide contract, based upon adequate consideration, to sell property for less than its value may fix the value of the
property for the purposes of the estate tax, a mere gratuitous promise to permit some favored individual, particularly the natural object of the bounty of the promissor, to purchase it at a grossly
inadequate price can have no such effect." Claire Giannini Hoffman,
2 T.C. 1160, 1179 (1943), affd sub nom., Giannini v. Commissioner,
148 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 730 (1945).
63 If this type of agreement is drawn up, the importance of complying
with the established requirements cannot be over-emphasized because of
the danger of paying tax for more than the stock is worth to the estate.
BowE, TAx PLANNING FOR ESTATES 90-91 (1955 Revision).
64 Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955); see LOWNDES & KAmm,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAxES 539-40 (1956).
65 Armstrong's Estate v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1944);
Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932); Claire Giannini Hoffman, 2
T.C. 1160 (1943), aif'd sub nom., Giannini v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 285
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 730 (1945).
66 Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1936); Lionel Weil, 22 T.C. 1267
(1954); Albert L. Salt, 17 T.C. 92 (1951); Dupee. Some Tax Problems in
Connection With Buy and Sell Agreements Involving Corporate Stock, 44
ILL. BAR J. 800 (1956).
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and it could sell for a higher price than that called for by the
option agreement. 67 Under the proposed plan, an agreement in
which all the individual stockholders would have the same rights
to purchase from each other in case any one of them should die
might well be sufficient to show consideration.68
Secondly, the agreement must be bona fide and made at arm'slength.69 This problem usually comes up where the parties are
of the same family. In these situations the agreement is scrutinized to ascertain the presence or absence of arm's-length dealing.70 Where a father and his son were on unfriendly terms and
the father employed a stock option agreement with his son as
a means of inducing him to remain in the family business, it
was held that the agreement was a bona fide business transaction.'
The facts of the situation under discussion do not present a
serious problem with regard to good faith and arm's-length dealing. This is because the valuation for inclusion purposes is the
same valuation to be used for the purposes of a charitable deduction. Also the rights of a third party (the charity), not a
member of the testator's family, are involved. These facts alone
should dispel any suspicion of fictitious dealing.
A third requirement of the testator's stock option plan is that,
not only must his estate be bound to sell the stock at the option
price but, the testator, while living, must also be bound to sell,
if at all, at such price.Y This appears to be a sound principle in
that any agreement binding only on the event of death clearly
67 See Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955); Michigan Trust
Co., 27 B.TNA. 556 (1933).
68 In Brodrick v. Gore, supra note 67, a state court had decided that the
agreement was binding on the executor; see John Q. Strange, P-H 1942 T.C.
Mem. Dec. 42247.
"Generally, the mutual promises of the parties in an 'arm's length' crosspurchase transaction provide the required consideration, since the parties do
not know who will die first." Friedman, Buy and Sell Agreements: A Review
and a New Look, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1053, 1072 (1957).
69 Commissioner v. Bensel, 100 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1938); Edwin R. Armstrong, P-H 1944 T.C. Mem. Dec. 44023, affld, 146 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1944);
McKinney, Some Income Tax Problems of Partnersand Death Problems of
Partners and Owners of Close Corporation Stock, 4 Ai. U. TAx. INST.
LEcTURES 109, 137 (1952).
70 Commissioner v. Bensel, supra note 69; John Q. Strange, P-H 1942 T.C.
Mem. Dec. 42247; Prop. Est. Tax Reg. § 20.2031-2 (h), 21 FED. REG. 7867
(1956).
71 Commissioner v. Bensel, supra note 69.
72 Baltimore Natl Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 642 (D. Md. 1955);
Harry W. Hammond, P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. 54271; Prop. Est. Tax Reg. §
?0.2031-2 (h), 21 FED. REG. 7867 (1956).
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does not measure the extent of the value of the property held by
the testator at time of death. 3 This requirement may be satisfied
if the testator and the optionee under the trust agree that if
either should desire to sell his stock while living, he must sell to
the other at the option price and that the other will be bound
to purchase at such price when the stock is offered. The option
must also be made available to the optionee for a period of time
after the testator's death and the trustee must be bound under
the trust instrument to sell to the optionee at the option price
should the optionee wish to exercise his option. It is submitted
that, under this type of agreement, the option price would limit
the stock valuation for inclusion in the gross estate and would
also limit the amount of the charitable deduction.
The restrictive option plans must stipulate the price at which
the stock is to be sold or provide some method of determining the
price.74 Although the price is given in the agreement, the determination of whether it is a fair price and not merely a vehicle
for a disguised bequest is to be made as of the date of the agreement, not the date of valuation for purposes of inclusion in the
gross estate.7 5
Conclusion
The discussion of the trust and estate tax principles in this
note was necessarily limited to the factual situation presented
in the introduction. However, the basic pattern of an estate plan
which features a gift subject to an option may be successfully
employed in many diverse close corporate situations. Through
the use of the plan set forth, the testator maximizes the probability of realizing his interests. Control of the stock remains in
the family, the charitable obligation is fulfilled, and the estate
taxes are lowered; should the corporation continue to prosper,
the family can obtain outright ownership of the shares of stock;
if the corporation is not successful, the family may step out of
the picture by merely declining to exercise the option.

73 Claire Giannini Hoffman, 2 T.C. 1160 (1943), aff'd sub iom., Giannini v.
Commissioner, 148 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 730 (1945). The
restrictions, if imposed only upon the death of the owner, do not limit the
value of the stock because it "did not become effective until the decedent's
death and did not affect its value until after his death." James H. Matthews,
3 T.C. 525 at 528 (1944).
74 2 BEVERIDGE, LAW OF FEDERAL EsTATE TAXATION § 19.17 (1956).
75 George Saxe McDonald, P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff51326; LowaNEs &
KRAMEa, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT TAXEs

535 (1956).
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The always-present spectre of possible litigation, with its attendant expenses and delays, should be enough to put the planner
on guard in his draftmanship. However, the use of the charitable
trust and stock option plan particularly calls for care on two key
points: (1) the plan should be drawn so that it is not self-invalidating under trust law because it fails to avoid divided
loyalty; (2) the option contract must be entered into, for sufficient
consideration, during the life of the testator, in order that the
option price be acceptable as the value of the gift for purposes
of federal estate tax valuation. The United States Supreme Court
has not ruled on the effect of the restrictive stock option agreement
on estate tax valuation,7" but the validity of the price limitation
for tax purposes has been upheld in the lower courts. It is in
the use of this limitation that the conditions, discussed above,
have been imposed.
Vernon 0. Teofan.
H. Theodore Werner

76 Pavenstedt, The Second Circuit Reaffirm the Efficacy of Restrictive
Stock Agreements to Control Estate Tax Valuation, 51 Mc-. L. REv. 1, 18
(1952).

